URBAN MARKETS, STATE PLANNING AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT , by Earl SCOTT

Introduction

The critical problem facing recently independent African governments is the uncommonly rapid growth in the urban population and the demands it generates for social services, affordable housing, food and employment opportunities. Indeed the rate of urban population growth is unpresidented (Table 1). Until recently, few African countries had cities with populations of over 1 million and only one, Egypt, had a city of over 5 million residents. Today, the urban population of Cairo stands at over 8.5 million, making it one of 34 cities world wide with a population of 5 million or more. This distinction however dubious will not last for long. By 2025, the UN Population Division projects, there will be 93 cities that can boast of more than five million residents (Table 1). Twenty-five of these will be in Africa, seven in Nigeria alone. By that time, Lagos will have a population of between 20 and 30 million people. The problem is that current and projected urban growth threatens to overwhelm available urban amenities, social services, food supplies and jobs. To stave off the impending crisis, governments have implemented social and economic reforms based on substantial state intervention into the urban economy.

The reforms, as suggested, have dual intentions, deemphasizing economic objectives and highlighting social ones. In emerging African socialist states, governments are attempting to reform and redirect society's goals along the lines of social collectivism, nationalization of food distribution and economic egalitarism. Ideologically, these reforms are the basis for a socialist transformation. According to theorists (Dumont; 1973, McGee, 1974; Rosberg and Callaghy, 1979; Quick, 1980), the "socialist transformation" has not yet occurred, but the "transition to socialism" has made considerable progress" (Ake 1981, p. 187). similarly, it is argued that the progress that has been made "has tended to be confined to the sphere of distribution and has barely touched the sphere of production..." (Ake 1981, p. 187). Reforms in the urban food distribution system, then, are essential to the success of government's socialist transformation, yet one can not fail to be surprised by the lack of attempts to systematically evaluate centrally planned reforms that are designed to accomplish long term social and economic objectives.

The adoption of a socialist strategy for devlopment meant that government assumed the responsibility for the provision of social services, jobs and adequate, affordable food, but with the realization that official agencies could not meet their responsibilities in these vital areas, scholars'attention shifted to non-governmental institutions and artisanal activities as potential contributors to the needs of urban residents. These non-governmental institutions and artisanal activities are associated with the urban informal sector. McGee (1974) distinguishes the informal sector from the formal sector in Third World Cities on the basis of the availability of income opportunities for urban residents. According to his scheme, formal sector income is derived mainly from public and private sector wages and informal sector income, both legal and illegal, is derived primarily from non-wage, artisanal activities. Participants in the informal sector are also self-employed entrepreneurs of which urban marketeers,who operate in urban open air markets, constitute a substantial proportion in African cities. Formally considered economically redundant and even injurious to national development (Lewis 1958, p. 402), the informal sector is now seen as potentially a major supplier of not only its own needs but the needs of urban residents in general (Truu and Black 1980, pp. 12-27, Zarenda 1980, pp. 297-305 and Hansen 1982, pp. 117-136).

This article examines Zambia's urban informal sector policies with special emphasis on the role assigned to markets and marketeers of Lusaka in national development. At the moment, government policy regarding the nature and role markets and marketeers are expected to play in urban and national economic development is not clear.[1] Indeed, Todd (1978) laments that "at the moment the Government has no explicit policy toward small-scale businesses [i.e., markets], and often gives the impression of wishing to discourage such enterprises." He argues further, that "In view of the vital positive role played by the informal sector in serving the low income population and in providing employment, the Government should actively seek to encourage it, without reducing its 'informality' and 'independence' (p. 33). This was not the case in the years leading up to 1980.

The article is divided into five parts. After a brief background on urbanization and population growth and market development in Zambia, three broad reform policies of social collectivism, nationalization of food distribution and economic egalitarianism are discussed. My purpose is two fold: a) to clarify government reform policies toward markets and marketeers as participants in the "transition to socialism" and b) to evaluate the responses of marketeers to government's dual intentioned reforms.

URBANIZATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

Urbanization in Zambia is highly localized. Urban centers are concentrated along the "line-of-rail," which links the administrative centers of Livingston and Lusaka with the relatively small industrial/mining towns on the Copperbelt. With the exception of a few agrarian-based towns along the Great East Road, the rest of Zambia is rural and poorly linked by road or rail. The urban centers, mainly European planned and built around the turn of the century, grew slowly until the eve of independence when legislative controls on African movement were rescinded. Since independence, the urban population has grown at a dramatic rate.

Today, Zambia has one of the highest percentage of its total population living in urban centers. In 1963 only 20.5 per cent of the total population lived in urban areas (Table 2). But six years later, the percentage had jumped to 29.4 per cent and by 1974 it had vaulted to nearly 36 per cent. Currently, the percentage of the population residing in urban areas stands at a dramatic 43 per cent (Table 2). This tremendous growth in the urban population means that even the most basic urban amenities and social services are becoming scarce. It also means that the labor force in both the informal and the formal sectors is growing rapidly, creating a crisis in unemployment and underemployment.

Zambia's informal sector is not unique in Third World countries, but it does have attributes that help to explain recent changes in government attitude and policy. Lusaka, founded in 1905 and named the capital of Northern Rhodesia in 1935, is the financial, commercial and administrative center of the country. Its African population, like that of the industrial/mining towns, grew gradually until 1964 when independence was achieved. Before then the city's population consisted mainly of small groups of Europeans, Asians, and Africans. With independence, legislative restrictions on the rural population were removed and the urban population of Lusaka increased dramatically. For example, between 1969 and 1978, Lusaka's population grew from 328,000 to 718,000 and its projected increase will exceed 1,000,000 by 1985. Some of this growth can be attributed to natural increase and to Asian immigration, but most of it is due to Zambian rural-to-urban migration. Current estimates of rural-to-urban migration are unavailable, but 55.6 per cent of Lusaka's population growth between 1963 and 1969 was attributed to in-migration (Todd, 1978, p.1). Of equal concern is the fact that between 61 and 80 per cent of the city's population live in high density squatter settlements (Kidron and Segal, 1981, p. 50). Thus far, the government has not been able to stem the rural exodus and urban growth continues at a rapid rate (Table 2), mainly by rural folk seeking better homes, jobs and social services.

Job opportunities

Rapid urban population growth is taxing the Council's ability to provide job opportunities for urban residents. Again, its successes have been modest and limited. Historically, the formal sector constituents have been the main beneficiaries of government generated wage employment, but the availability of these high salary, high status jobs has declined in recent years. From 1963 to 1969 formal sector employment in Lusaka increased approximately 11 per cent per year, while employment in the informal sector increased by about 24 per cent. On the other hand, there was a modest increase in unemployment from 3.2 per cent to 13.9 per cent, while at the same time the male labor force more than doubled, from 32,019 to 67,292. Employment figures are sketchy and less accurate since 1969, "but it is clear that, nationally, formal sector employment reached a peak at the end of 1975, with the total number employed at about 398,000...and by early 1978 formal sector employment had decreased to about 350,000" (Todd, 1978, p. 3). The urban unemployed included, possibly for the first time, well educated, highly skilled Zambians, but it would soon consist mainly of a large number of secondary school leavers and unskilled men and women from small towns and villages throughout the country.

With little hope of employment in the formal sector, the urban unemployed turned to the informal sector. After careful analysis of several sets of data Todd, et al. (1979, p. 4) concluded: "we can therefore say...that between 20 and 25 per cent of the overall labor force, and between 11 and 16 per cent of males available for work in Lusaka are self-employed [i.e., in the informal sector]. Informal sector economic activities provide jobs as marketeers, craftsmen, manufacturers, and shop owners. But the prospect of these informal activities absorbing an ever larger work force is bleak. Tinsmithing, furniture making and manufacturing are essentially saturated and are capable of absorbing only a few additional workers. On the other hand, marketing, benefiting from the rapid increase in the number of new and improved markets in upgraded squatter settlements, suggest that "there is no sign yet that this activity is saturated" (Todd, 1978, p. 28). Fruit and vegetable sellers, who are mainly women, are increasing. Fish sellers may also be expanding. And recently, an increasingly large number of young school leavers, called "mishanga boys" and described as "chronically under-employed" have become involved in illegal vending or black marketing of cigarettes and staples in the Zambian diet. These staples include cooking oil and maize and have been officially classified as "essential commodities" to be sold through government outlet stores at designated prices.

These retail activities, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, offer a glimmer of hope in an otherwise bleak employment projection. They complement formal sector generated jobs and should be an integral part of any planned employment strategy (ILO 1972, p. 229). The need is great. Todd and his colleagues estimate that a minimum of 20,000 persons per year will be seeking some form of productive employment in the urban informal sector. Nongovernmental institutions and non-wage activities remain potential sources of productive employment in Lusaka. As the urban population has grown and the need for an urban distribution system has become more critical, the number of markets and marketeers have increased to accommodate these needs. Presently there are about 36 markets in Lusaka that generate approximately one-third of the job opportunities in the informal sector, making marketeers the largest gainfully employed group in the non-wage, urban economy that is still able to absorb additional workers.

The critical issues, then, are not wholly economic. Instead, they are policy issues and the implications those policies have for future development. Important questions are: a) Why do governments seek to control markets and marketeers and b) In what way(s) will government policy change the organizational structure of urban markets and marketeers to accommodate the rapid growth in the urban labor force and to conform to its socialist principals for national economic development? Though "woefully inadequate" (Todd 1979, p. 32), knowledge of the nature and structure of Zambia's informal sector is growing. On the other hand, we know very little about official government policy and stated or unstated attitudes regarding reforms deemed necessary in the informal sector. Before addressing the process by which a national retail policy evolved and the manner in which marketeers reacted to it, a brief outline of market development in Lusaka is offered to distinguish between unauthorized and authorized markets and to lay the basis for an understanding of the conflicts between official agencies who claim authority over them.

MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN LUSAKA

Unauthorized markets

There are two basic kinds of informal sector markets in Lusaka. They developed in three distinct stages. Today they are well established as Party operated markets but are in a jurisdictional conflict with the City Council and its which clams control over all urban markets. The first wave is those unauthorized markets that grew up in response to demand for processed and unprocessed food, cloth, and crafts on sites in the city center and in high density, squatter settlements. These unauthorized markets are similar to village and roadside markets and they existed without government sanction.

Unauthorized markets developed in association with the growth of transportation and the development of ethnic residential areas (Map 1). The first unauthorized markets were located near the main rail lines which linked Lusaka, with the Copperbelt to the north and the European commercial (estate) farm settlements to the south. The early rail-side markets served African laborers en route to and from these labor demand areas within the country. Cooked food and other market goods were purchased by African men journeying to South Africa and Shaba (Katanga) Province to work in the mines there. Like the travelers they served, the traders in these rail-side markets were men who had left their village homes in search of wage labor in the developing industrial/mining towns and administrative centers. These markets also served the small, but growing African population that was gainfully employed as industrial workers, government employees, and domestic servants in Lusaka proper.

The second wave of unauthorized markets were similar to the rail-side markets but sprang up at intersections of major thoroughfares, at large bus terminals, near large retail shops, and adjacent to government buildings (Map 1). These sites are all near the CBD and sellers specialized in convenience goods, especially household goods, cloth and cooked food (from "Nsima shops"), for bachelors and men separated from their families.At this early period in zambia's market development, food sellers were rendering an especially useful service to workers who had no established food service to patronize.

The third group of unauthorized markets developed in the rapidly growing, but racially uniform, squatter settlements (Map 1). These settlements are located near the central city (Map 1). They developed as free housing provided by industries whose products were destined for the mines on the Copperbelt. As the squatter settlements grew, usually on the edge away from the city and some distance from the convenience markets near the city center, additional squatter markets were built. As Map 1 shows, the development of unauthorized markets followed the expansion of residential growth. Today nearly all of these large, high density areas have their own market. At independence these large squatter settlements were unauthorized and they, as well as the markets that served them, were technically illegal and subject to much police harassment. In 1972 many were "authorized" through the Council sponsored upgrading scheme described above. The authorization of squatter settlements raised the question of which official body, the Council or the Party, had administrative and fiscal authority over authorized squatter markets. The resolution of this critical question would serve to define the role of markets in national economic development.

"Authorized" markets

The second type of informal sector market is authorized markets. Initially, authorized markets were mainly government built municipal markets in recently developed, European urban centers like Livingston, Kabwe, the Copperbelt towns and Lusaka and in selected residential areas. They were authorized under a single national ordinance issued by the then Governor of

Northern Rhodesia, J. A. Moybin, called the "Market Ordinance of 1937" (Government Gazette 1938, p. 75). In Lusaka, authorized markets were controlled by the City Council and were listed in the official gazette. They had stalls, public facilities, and scales, and they enjoyed the sanction of government. The distribution of Council administered markets and shops in Map 1 suggest that several were intentionally located to accommodate the growing racially diverse urban population in Lusaka. More importantly, the Ordinance dealt with aspects of urban market operations other than location, and the Council has conveniently based its current reform policies on these early provisions.

The market ordinance was passed into law on December 24, 1937 "to provide for the establishment and management of markets." It was later amended [The Laws of Zambia, Chap. 473, Section 6(1)] and called the Lusaka Market Act. The Act contains many provisions, but those quoted here relate directly to the basis upon which the Council imposes legal constraints and regulations on markets and marketeers in Lusaka:

> 1. The minister or a local authority is empowered by law to a) establish markets, b) provide necessary facilities, c) impose and collect stallages, rents, fees and tolls, d) appoint inspector, e)regulate their use, f) prescribe goods that can be sold, g) prohibit the sale of any specified kind of good within any specified area, h) prescribe the weight, scales and measures to be used in the sale of any particular produce, and i) determine the maximum price which may be demanded on the sale by retail of any article of food in a market (pp. 3-4).

In addition to these operational powers, fiscal powers were also granted. The Act specified that all stallings, rents, etc., collected from market leases were to go into the general fund of the local authority and it provided for stiff fines on those who established unauthorized markets of one hundred kwacha and a further fine of 10 kwacha for every day the offense is committed (p.6). Essentially, the amended Act empowered the City Council to control all aspects of market operations, ranging from the extraction of city revenues to sanctioning the activities of marketeers. Nonetheless, their is an important exemption in the Act, which favors all farmers but especially large scale, estate formers. The Act states that markets can be established and maintained on land owned by any person, leased or lowfully occupied by him primarily for the supply of persons employed by him upon such land. Estate farmers legally sell to their workers, often at quite favorable prices, but sales to traders, to wholesalers, and to government-run parastatals, all of which are important sources of farm income, are not addressed in the Act. These farm transactions raise the question of their loyality and the extent to which the profits should be taxed.

By implementing the provisions of the amended Act, the Council single handedly formulated and applied government policy. Later, when challenged by leaders of UNIP, it actively sought to solidify its regulatory and revenue generating powers over Lusaka's markets. In so doing a line was clearly drawn between the colonially based authority of the Council and the ideologically based influence of the Party. The national government, which is the only institution legally authorized to use force in settling disputes (Goulet 1971 p. 112), sought to define authority through a policy of social collectivization.

THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF URBAN MARKETS

Collectivization of markets, though difficult to assess, has improved the unemployment situation in Lusaka's informal sector and it has altered the organizational structure of the food distribution system. The acceptance of collectivism has been mixed and opposition has come from expected and unexpected interest groups. But official reaction to issues and concerns raised by opponents of collectivism has become integral parts of the government's working policies toward markets and marketeers. The critical issues of fiscal and administrative authority, however, have yet to be fully resolved.

The cooperative movement

Shortly after independence, market leaders welcomed the cooperative arrangement as a hopeful strategy for community-based development. They also saw cooperatives as a way of regaining much of the autonomy markets enjoyed under the colonial administration. More importantly, cooperative status automatically bestowed "authorized" status on markets and marketeers, though not officially recognized by the Lusaka City Council. Party branch officials quickly seized this opportunity to organize consumer and market cooperatives in the newly "authorized" residential areas such a Chilinje, Kalingalinga and Kanyama and popular community beer halls were promptly converted into small, cooperatively managed produce markets. The beer halls were abandoned when, after Independence, the new government built more substantial taverns. Some cooperative markets still operate from the larger of these original beer halls: Matero, Kabwata, and Chyinje. More recently, new markets have been constructed or renovated as African residential areas grew or were upgraded (Map 1). The early enthusiasm for the cooperative movement carried over into these new markets and the Party quickly organized them into cooperatives as well.

Expectedly, the cooperative movement was not unanimously endorsed. Recently established and relatively prosperous women fish sellers openly resisted reorganization efforts. Fish consumption is high year round and artificially low prices are very popular. But as late as 1980, fish sellers, and the fishermen who supplied them, were still resisting Party pressure. The few that have capitulated are reluctant participants and their hesitancy, along with the rejection by others, is now a major source of contention between the Party and their sector of the commercial community (Daily Mail, June 23, 1980; Daily Mail, June 24, 1980).

Street venders have also reluctantly embraced the Party's cooperative movement. Food sellers in particular, who performed a welcomed service to down town workers, had less leverage than fish sellers and grudgingly succumbed to Party pressure. Party officials, while endorsed by the government, had no authority to compel participation. Indeed, the cooperative movement was stalled until the Lusaka City Council announced its desire to remove street venders and other mobile traders from the high demand "frontal" spaces of stores in the CBD and from sites near Council designated markets (Evans and Maimbo 1976, p. 9). The Party supported this policy and even helped to establish displaced venders in squatter markets where they were organized into consumer and marketing cooperative societies (Evans and Maimbo 1976, p. 8). There they were sanctioned, but subject to Party rules and regulations (Todd 1978, p. 5). Conversely, they were protected from non-member competition and resident consumers were shielded from alleged profiteering and other forms of exploitation..

<u>The Council, an unlikely foe</u>

The successful reorganization of residential markets and street venders masked the underlying administrative, fiscal and ideological conflicts between the Council and the Party. Initially, The Council was simply unwilling to relinquish its authority over existing municipal markets to Party organized cooperative societies and unions. Beginning in the early 1970s, "consumer" cooperative societies expressed a desire to sever administrative relations with the Lusaka City Council in a spirit of self-reliance and self-management. The Council acknowledged the growing enthusiasm for consumer cooperatives, but strenuously resisted any Party take over efforts. The seriousness of the conflict is demonstrated in the long and heated debate between the Council and the Luburma Consumer Cooperative Society, which ended when the society unilaterally assumed administrative responsibility for the market (Daily Mail, Monday 17, 1977). As expected, the take over was applauded by officials of UNIP, but oddly enough by the Fisheries Marketeers Union as well, who initially sided with the Council in opposing the Party cooperative structure. Their endorsement,however, was the second major victory for the cooperative movement because the government at that time was essentially powerless to demand participation and was reduced to intimidating union members and other marketeers by threatening to ban them from operating in all other legal markets (Daily Mail, Saturday 22, 1977).

The conflict over administrative authority peaked when the Council claimed control over recently built and renovated markets in upgraded squatter settlements. Approximately seven "upgraded" settlement markets were deemed "authorized" and logically fell under the authority of the City Council. The partial list in Table 3 shows that this brought the number of authorized markets under the authority of the Council to about eleven. The remaining 25 or so markets were mainly co-operatives, organized and run by local branches of UNIP (Todd 1979, p. 13). Far the first time since Zambia embraced its socialist strategy for development, the dual process of market authorization and its ideological ramifications were clear. As Table 3 shows, many cooperatively managed markets still fell under the administrative jurisdiction the the Council. Among other things, this meant that the regulatory and fiscal authority (i.e., the power to require licenses, collect rents and fees and to impose fines) remained exclusively with the Council. A modest concession to the Party was to allow it to assume the power to collect daily fees for market use and to restrict participation by demanding a National Registration Card, Party Membership Card and a letter from the Party Branch Officer from non-cooperative users (Todd 1979, p. 16).

The Council's position weakened by the mid 1970s when it became clear that the demand for urban market space and stalls in existing and new markets could not be met (Council Minutes, February 9, 1978). Initially, requests for additional "public" space or to provide additional facilities were ignored. Instead, the Council followed an unstated policy to restrict entry into marketeering and to freeze the number of "authorized" markets at the current level of about 36. By withholding market authorization and employing other administrative barriers the Council stabilized the number of "authorized" markets but the number of cooperatively managed "unauthorized" ones began to increase (Table 3) and the number of illegal marketeers rebounded, thereby heightening the tension between sympathetic Party officials and Council bureaucrats. By 1980, about five years after the "freeze" on market authorization, Party branch officials openly criticized the Council's policies as centric and counterproductive to the goals of community level self-management. System paralysis set in and cooperative members were snared in political limbo between a recalcitrant Council and an impotent Party.

Chunga Market Cooperative Society is a good example of how the Council used administrative barriers to undermine community-based, self-help initiatives by Party organized cooperative societies and unions. Chunga market was built in 1972, but on June 13, 1980, we learned from the town clerk (personal interview) that the market had not been gazetted or authorized (Council Minutes, June 20, 1980). An effort was made on August

8, 1979, to obtain legal status by applying to the Lusaka City Council to lease the market to the society, but this failed despite the endorsement of the mayor. The Chunga Cooperative Society received a letter dated January 2, 1980, from the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister explaining that the request to lease Chunga market was denied because this would be in violation of the Market Act since the market had not been gazetted (Council Minutes, June 13, 1980). This meant that Chunga market and the marketeers operating in it have functioned illegally for eight years and their future status was unclear. This situation, like others we have discussed, stems from artificial obstacles rather than the nature of the operation (Truu and Black 1980, p. 24).

Finally, The Council used its fiscal powers to discourage prospective marketeers, especially those hoping to operate in markets on Council administered "public" land (Table 3). The problem stemmed from the fact that the Council was legally empowered to set and collect fees and rents from Party organized markets on city owned land (By-Laws, Chapter 433, Sect. 5). As Table 4 illustrates, fees varied from market to market with some society members required to pay up to k3 membership dues. In addition to market user fees, the societies are obliged to pay the Council a stipulated renter fee for the market space. Over a period of time the accumulated sums mounted and societies often became delinquent. For example, Table 5 shows that for two time periods between January 1976 and 1977, the Luburma Marketeers Cooperative Society owed the Lusaka City Council and accumulated sum of k32,766.76. Local Party officials publicly appealed to the national office of UNIP to intervene on behalf of market cooperatives and write-off their indebtedness to the Council. Officials argued convincingly that the Council had not met its obligation to provide essential facilities of water, toilets, stalls and security (Chelstone, June 29, 1976).

Furthermore, they claimed that excessively high and unevenly applied user and renter fees not only created severe indebtedness, but heighten descent among marketeers and severely constrained investment initiatives by community-based cooperatives (Todd 1979 p. 61).

Ostensibly, the debts were nullified, but by 1980 marketeers had become defiant of Council regulations and Party demands. Hundreds of sanctioned marketeers had joined unsanctioned ones in operating in restricted and interstitial "free" zones. Results of interviews with marketeers discussed below reveals a deep seated disillusionment with Council policies and is the main reason why government and the Party can boast of a successful cooperative movement at the community level.

Spatial organization of market authority

While Party objectives are clearly being realized, its authority over markets and marketeers is localized, confined mainly to the low income residential areas near the edge of the city. The residents are usually African and they are served by squatter markets. As Map 2 shows, the ethnic and income character of Lusaka's residential areas have not changed substantially over the past two decades and Party influence tends to reflect this persistence. The Council, by contrast, maintains authority over markets near the CBD, in the low-density, high income areas adjacent to the CBD and in the moderately high income areas near the government district. The residents are usually Asians, Europeans and well-to-do Zambians and they are served by European-type grocery shops. Numerically, collectivism is a reality, but the wealth of the urban food distribution system remains in the free enterprise sector under Council authority. In the future, the cooperative movement will continue to face stiff opposition from the Council and the expatriate owner-operated shops it administers, but the critical test of achievement during this "transition to socialism" will be the persuasion of marketeers to willingly embrace an egalitarian principle of development.

GAINING CONTROL OF THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Protecting marketeers

Why is it necessary for government to gain control of the food distribution system? Whether the likelihood is deemed regrettable or not, underdeveloped countries engaged in a socialist transformation must consider a reasonable answer. For Zambia, part of the answer lies in its economic reforms designed to make available food accessible to all at uniform prices. But before we discuss reactions to this egalitarian-based strategy for development, the rationale and legal basis for the nationalization of food distribution are discussed.

For many years, the first unauthorized markets were dominated by male marketeers. Prior to 1953, colonial law restricted the movement of women. Women could not establish residency in large cities, and they could not become marketeers, except in partnership with their husbands. Single women were banned from marketing entirely. This ban on single women and the unsparing limitations on married women remained in effect until after 1964 when the newly established government quickly abolished all restrictions on African mobility. It was then left to women, who had been denied entry into the urban market structure, to carve out a niche where men had dominated for decades. With little experience and no established facilities or apprenticeship connections women initially sold produce and cooked food from their homes and later established small squatter markets. Squatter markets were convenient and free of government regulation where women learned entrepreneural skills and experimented with different trade items. They gradually came to dominate most high density, squatter settlement markets and certain commodity trade in legally designated municipal markets such as fish, vegetables, and fruit (estimate of 85 per cent female to 15 per cent male). Today, marketing is essentially a women's occupation, with them constituting about 62 per cent of the marketeers in markets of Lusaka (Todd 1978, p. 14).

In addition to the growing dominance of women as gainfully employed marketeers, an undetermined, but substantial increase in unsanctioned and thus unregulated marketeering has also developed. The mishanga boys have been identified as one example of such marketeers. Foreign itinerate traders, mainly from Ziare, but from other neighboring countries as well, is another important group. Foreign traders ranked third after the Eastern and Northern Provinces in the per cent of total marketeers in five of Zambia's largest markets, with nearly 14 per cent (Todd 1978, p. 15, Table 3). coincidentally, these activities represent post-colonial developments in the informal sector and all three conflict with governments new development strategy by engaging in allegedly excessive profit generating enterprises. Government's initial reforms, then, were designed to bring these groups under its control and thereby weaken or eliminate "profiteering" from the economy. Consequently, among the first laws to be enacted were those designed to legally confine the retailing of food to designated market sites and to protect sanctioned, regulated marketeers from outside competition. From the implementation of these first laws to around the mid 1970s, the government and the Party explicitly meshed legal and social objectives to implement its egalitarian principles of development.

The first step in gaining full control of the food distribution system involved transferring market sites and produce outlets from the private, free enterprise sector to the public, government managed sector. The government and the Party relied almost entirely on its colonially-based powers to achieve this transfer.

Lusaka Market Act: the basis of policy reforms

The Lusaka Market Act, as amended, became the sole instrument of government and the Party to formulate and implement a policy to nationalize the retail sector of the economy. As we have seen, the first priority of the government (i.e., the Council) and the Party was to confine urban retailing to designated market sites near the CBD and in "authorized" residential areas to licensed and cooperative members. To implement this policy, the Council used its statutory powers to protect those legally designated municipal markets of Luburma and Cha Cha Cha and those Party organized cooperative markets such as Chipata and Kabwata (Todd 1979, pp. 18-19) by creating large noncommercial zones around them where trade and marketing were prohibited. Through this action, the Council extended its regulatory powers to marketeers themselves, which is specifically addressed in the amended Act. The Market Act regulations state that 1) no person shall, in any public place within a radius of two miles from the center of a market, sell any goods except in a market (p. 22); 2) that no person shall buy retail any article of food in a market at a price higher than the price determined under the regulation---but this maximum price shall not exceed the maximum price fixed by any other written law for sale by retail of the same article of food (p. 22); and 3) that no person shall, within the market area, sell or offer for sale or barter any goods in any public place other than in a market, except with the permission of the local authority (Lusaka By-Laws, p. 65). These laws had legal and social implications: a) they had the effect of creating large buffer zones around all authorized markets were commercial transactions were illegal, thereby protecting sanctioned traders from unsanctioned domestic and foreign traders (Fig. 1), and 2) they gave government and the Party authority to set prices on selected foods and convenience items, thereby weakening the profit objective among marketeers and promoting the idea of equal access to essential foods and convenience items.

The "protectionist" policies were initially enacted to control the activities of neighboring African traders, especially the highly competitive, profit minded craft traders form Zaire. This was achieved through a skillful definition of "goods" produced in Zambia. The regulations restricted goods sold in established markets to those produced in Zambia, but excluded imported cloth, hardware, food, and other goods commonly sold in Asian and European owner-operated shops. The regulations specifically define "goods" to mean: 1) foodstuffs, livestock, and other agricultural and natural products, the growth or produce of Zambia, and 2) articles of handicraft made and sold by or on behalf of the same person not being a company or firm and of which not less than seventy-five per cent in content or value of the materials used shall have been grown or produced in Zambia (p. 21). This meant that wood and leather crafts, which dominate the prosperous tourist market, especially short-term resident urban tourists, must be made in Zambia of its raw products and sold in designate or "authorized" markets.

Zairean traders, who were the target of these laws, must establish that their crafts were made form Zambian materials in Zambia and they must be sold in legally designated markets. Otherwise, they are subject to arrest and deportation. To circumvent these regulations, many Zaireans have temporarily settled in Lusaka while others sell door-to-door in the interstitial "free" zones (Fig. 1) of suburban residential areas where their detection all but impossible. Consequently, this initial attempt at protectionism failed, but it did succeed in making life miserable for Zambians themselves.

controlling national food distribution

To foster it egalitarian ideals, the government and the Party went much further than the protection of domestic markets and marketeers. Government sought, through the powers granted to it under the Market Act, to gain control over all levels of food retailing, including parastatal outlets, small shops, and both urban and rural open-air markets. This policy, though ideologically sound, is economically weak. The Market Act empowered the national government to locate government constructed and government-managed produce outlets in any government-run parastatials and authorized market (Table 6). The regulations state that "the inspector of markets may reserve any stall in the market for the sale of any particular kind of good" (p. 22). Under this provision, The National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) and the Zambian Horticultural Marketing Board (ZAMHORT) have located produce outlets in the municipal markets of Luburma and Cha Cha Cha near the CBD, in the squatter markets near the CBD and on the edge of the city, in the "second class shopping area" adjacent to the CBD, and in the low density, high income suburbs near the CBD and the government district (Map 1). Produce sold in these outlets is of good quality, is often packaged, and is sold at government fixed prices. These outlets also clearly cater to the high income Zambian and foreign consumers, and represents the Council's continued effort to provide European-type grocery shops in a now entirely African markets, a function Cha Cha Cha market performed during colonial time.

Government-run produce outlets do make available foodstuffs accessible to all at uniform prices, but not without its economic and social costs. They also represent extensive government intervention into the retail sector of the urban economy, the economic and social benefits of which are unproven. On the other hand, nationalization as a basic strategy for economic and social development is strongly advocated for transitional societies (Goulet 1977, pp. 111-13). Still questions persist regarding its usefulness for economic growth and the proper scope of nationalism itself (Lindblom 1977, pp. 112-13). Consequently, the basic assumption that development must be pursued within a framework of nationalism (Goulet 1977, p. 111) requires additional empirical evidence before nationalization can be judged an effective strategy for development.

Though well intended, the nationalization of food distribution, especially at the lower levels of the retail structure, is ill advised. Its effect on owner-operated shops, now basically owned by Zambian families, and marketeers is adverse. From interviews we were able to conduct with managers of department stores, owner-operated shops, marketeers, and consumers, confirmed that the government-run outlets and shops were more competitive, both in terms of price and quality, than the owner-operated shops or the marketeers and that both were being forced out of business. News reports supported their opinion complaining that government-run outlets clearly exacerbate the unemployment problem among self-employed Zambians (Times of Zambia, February 27, 1980). Marketeers are disadvantaged by these outlets in yet another way: they vie for the same public (i.e., legal) space in which sanctioned marketing can expand. Nationalism, while providing some benefits to urban residents has impacted negatively on marketeers by severely limiting the urban public space in which they can operate and by placing family owner-operated shops and marketeers in a uncompetitive position relative to government-run enterprises.

FEES, TAXES, RENTS AND LICENSES AS INSTRUMENTS OF SOCIAL REFORM

Like colonial governments before it (Good 1973, p. 775), the national government, through the Council and the Party, formulated reform policies which lead to partial, but significant government control of the food distribution system. The distribution and price of "essential commodities" and some convenience goods are controlled through produce outlets in parastatials and in selected Council and Party-run markets. Impressive as this accomplishment is, price and distribution controls effect only a small segment of the retail sector and proportionately an even smaller portion of the consumer market. Council administered, expatriate-managed shops and "self-employed" marketeers are either exempt or posses the private ingenuity to avoid onerous government regulations, an ancient practice among small-scale marketeers (Truu and Black 1980, p. 12).

The point at issue is the relative number of people served by "controlled" as opposed to "uncontrolled" outlets. Compared to controlled produce outlets, expatriate-managed shops serve the majority of expatriate and a significant share of well-to-do Zambian consumers and traditional markets serve an overwhelming majority of Zambian consumers. Consequently, if a planned egalitarian society is to be achieved, social reforms must be effectively introduced to marketeers. This was the fundamental reason for government's vigorous efforts to require uniform prices on essential and convenience goods. However well intentioned, marketeers, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, had to be persuaded of its efficacy and of the methods employed to achieve it. This final section examines the formulation of this egalitarian-based reform policy and the responses of marketeers to the impact it has had on their livelihood activities.

Regulations for social change

The original Market Ordinance of 1937 dealt only with the orderly conduct of marketeers in urban market places. Colonial authorities employed the ordinance to maintain law-and-order in the rapidly growing African convenience markets, but unlawful acts were rare and few authorities were actually posted on market sites. Markets on the Copperbelt grew rapidly and were, in the view of Europeans, "overcrowded" and "noisy", but "very law-abiding places" (Breslford, 1946). Marketeers in Lusaka say that there were no authorized supervisors or officials to oversee the day-to-day operations of the market before Independence. Instead, the day-to-day operations were supervised by individual marketeers who had earned certain acknowledged rights and privileges by virtue of their experience and respect of others, a practice rooted in the structure of pre-colonial markets (Christenson, 1961, p.126; Hill, 1966, p.299 and Kjekshus, 1977,pp. 114-15). Seemingly Africans, who took up marketing in Lusaka, simply transferred their accustomed practice of exercising acknowledged authority to the urban milieu (Table 2), which served their purposes and maintained their autonomy relative to the colonial administration.

Marketeers also recalled that when few Africans were in Lusaka, the colonial administrators simultaneously imposed many fees and taxes and other kinds of unfamiliar regulations on them presumably to defray the costs of stall construction, security and market maintenance (Table 6). They expressed two main complaints. First, their strongest objection was against the steady increase in the market tax, which began during the colonial period and continued even after independence. They said, for example, that the Lusaka City Council's market fee increased progressively from the colonial period of 3d (2n), 6d (5n), 1s (10n) and finally to the period just before independence when the tax was raised to 1s 3d (12n) per day far each renter. At this point, marketeers staged the first of two recorded protest against established authority. They refused to pay the assessed fees and taxes and boycotted the authorized, municipal markets and began selling illegally in small groups in unauthorized areas.

Secondly, marketeers complained that since Independence, fees, taxes and rents have not only increased, but have been imposed unevenly, and the controls and regulations have been applied selectively. Government documents confirm their claims and Table 6 illustrates that many more regulations have been imposed. First, the new Trade Licensing Act of 1968 required that all retailers, from peddlers to wholesalers, be licensed. The amount of the fee varies by kind of retailer and location of operation. For example, peddlers pay k5, and hawkers k10, but traders in prescribed areas pay k50 and wholesalers pay k100. In 1973 licenses and fees were increased substantially for wholesalers to k300 (Trade Licensing Act, p. 15). Stall licenses cost a flat rate of k5 and traders operating outside Council designated market were subject to a k25 fine, but both regulations were unevenly enforced. In 1977, the Council required that all marketeers operating in an established market pay a levy of two kwacha per month (Market Amendment No. 8 of 1977), but squatter settlement markets, which were being organized by local branches of UNIP, were excluded.[1] Expatriate owned or operated suburban shops were also excluded.[2]

By 1977 the dual nature of the Council's food distribution reforms was clear. First, taxes and fees on the retail sector would absorb significantly more of the administrative costs of the city, a function formalized, but only incidentally performed under the colonial administration. Regarding markets, its 1977 amendment to the Marketing Act stated explicitly that ninety per cent of the two kwacha levy was to go into the general fund of the local authority (Government Publication, 1977, p. 23). Secondly, fees, taxes and especially licenses would be instruments of marketing control. Unlicensed sellers, operating anywhere, were intolerable. The Council even waged a weak, but disruptive, campaign of harassment against co-operatively organized markets on Council owned land (See list in Table 3). This was achieved through threats of withdrawing or reallocating existing market sites to other, more profitable, urban functions and by price control officials raiding, arresting and fining vendors from k100 to k300 each for alleged commodity price violations (Todd 1979, p. 21), levels far above the legislated fine of k25. At the same time, foreign craft traders, watch repairmen, cooked food sellers and other unsanctioned mobile marketeers, who operated in the CBD, were periodically harassed by the city police. While marketeers objected to Council imposed fees and taxes and attempts to regulate their operations, they were especially concerned about government's urban food policy.

The aspect of government's urban food policy marketeers objected to most is the present stringent retail price controls on selected commodities, especially foodstuffs that could be legally sold in designated markets. Marketeers viewed this as a new and unwarranted restriction on their established activities. They recalled, for example, that the Colonial administration placed no controls on commodities sold in the market or on the price they could be sold for. But the marketeers we interviewed were not completely correct on this point. The colonial government did prohibit the sale of game meat and beer of any kind and it did impose fixed prices on selected commodities as early as 1922 and again in 1929 on grain, dried fish, beans, onions, eggs, and fowl, all commodities that were considered essential in the African diet. Although the rationale for this practice is not known, price fixing seemed to have persisted until independence and either maintained or reinstated by the post colonial government (Central African Archives, 1950, p. 140).

The critical issue today is government apparent intent to provide uniformly low cost foodstuffs to urban residents regardless of the costs involved in supplying it. Marketeers in general have complained of this policy, but women fish sellers have been particularly angered by it since early in 1977. They argue convincingly that fixed prices for fish do not take into account the fisherman's price, the transport cost and the sellers need to make a reasonable profit (Todd 1979, pp. 16 and 45-47). Though labeled "fish mongers" and "profiteers" by both government and Party officials, their response thus far has been to ignore the announced retail price for fish.

Formation of an urban coalition

Mishanga boys, who are deemed illegal under government's "protectionist" policies, are similarly effected by government price regulations, which prohibit them from selling essential commodities of cooking oil, mealie meal (maize), wheat flour and butter in the city and at unauthorized prices. Like women fish sellers, mishanga boys openly defy government regulations. Furthermore, they boldly operate in the prohibited zones near the two municipal markets and in shop front areas on Cario Road in the central business district. Possibly because Mishanga boys refuse to operate in designated markets like fish sellers do and because they insist on selling unsanctioned food and convenience commodities, the government and the Party are less tolerant of their activities than they are of fish sellers. Indeed, their activities are a constant source of consternation for the government and the Party and they are soundly condemned and harassed for insubordination and black marketing, an act deemed disloyal to government efforts for national social reforms.

Their patrons, on the other hand, were far less critical of them and choose not to overtly endorse the Party's claims of disloyalty against them. The boys are accepted as part of the involuntary urban unemployed who have become businessmen rather than remaining pickpockets and thieves. In point of fact, the mishanga boys do provide an important service to urban residents, mainly because they are able to provide food and other consumer goods unavailable through government-run outlets. For example, at a time of severe food shortages during the last months of Zimbabwe's struggle for majority rule, mishanga boys could provide "essential commodities" to those who were willing to pay their price. Furthermore, as they argue convincingly themselves, the sale of essential commodities illegally or on the black market is an acceptable substitute for government generated gainful employment. Their retort to Party officials is, "better to sell on the [black] market than to steal other people's property," and argument tacitly accepted by the urban society at large (Times of Zambia, February 12 and May 4, 1980).

Black marketing and the Zambian attitude toward it are common but little research has been conducted and it is not well understood. Experiences elsewhere have shown that unsanctioned transactions or smuggling may occur in any type of society and that such unofficial exchange is often associated with the rigidness in socialist economic planning (Truu and Black 1980, p. 12). It does appear that the government and the Party unwittingly created black marketeers by officially establishing large illegal urban spaces, by setting the price for essential commodities and then vigorously enforcing the ban against profiteering by licensed sellers and black marketeers. The mishanga boys, like fish sellers and other legitimate marketeers, responded rebelliously to what they saw as an unwarranted government intervention into their legitimate search for worthwhile employment. Their combined actions, though uncoordinated and unplanned, presented a unified rebuff of established policies representing, in essence, the formation of a new coalition in the urban informal sector.

This unstructured coalition, championed by the mishanga boys, but born of collective despair, was fully "endorsed" by other marketeers who were unfairly constrained under the ban on the sale of essential commodities. The months after October 5, 1979, when the ban was imposed (Trades Licensing Act No. 170), were filled with confusion, frustration, and finally marketeers' second major protest in which the mishanga boys allowed the government seven days to provide them with legal wage employment, declaring: "If they do not, we are going to continue selling on the black market" (Times of Zambia, February 12 and May 4, 1980). The confusion stemmed from the price controller's interpretation of the law to apply to all marketeers, licensed and unlicensed, stallholders in Council and co-operative markets, and licensed businesses in municipal compound markets. According to his interpretation, it was illegal for anyone to sell essential commodities in any market. After many complaints of unfair treatment and false accusations of involvement in illegal activities, the government acquiesced and rescinded the ban on 28 March 1980.

By late 1979, the protest had peaked. Legal marketeers had been forced to join illegal ones in operating in restricted and interstitial "free" zones and they felt little obligation to conform to government-fixed prices or pay established fees and taxes. In essence, inapt policies forced marketeers to abandon legal markets and operate in illegal spaces, an extreme action unmentionable under less rigid economic and political conditions. Interviews with sixty marketeers between July 5 and July 28, 1980 confirm the depth of their disenchantment. They were asked: "Why do you choose to operate in illegal markets?" A small percentage said they had "no specific reason" (3.4 percent) and a few others said that there was "no market near [their] homes" (7.7 percent). A relatively large percentage said the illegal market gave them "good access to customers" (16.7 percent). By far the most often stated reasons for selling in illegal markets were due to government policy: "control of essential commodities" (13.8 percent), "control of prices" (26.6 percent), and "cannot afford high rents" (33.3 percent). The government, and to some extent, the Party, now impotent and ineffectual against this increasingly powerful alliance of marketeers, appealed to them to "adhere strictly to announced prices for essential goods" and warned that nonconformity could mean the reinstatement of the ban (Daily Mail, May 12, 1980), a warning that went essentially unheeded. This tacit recognition of a politically weak, but economically strong, informal sector coalition will no doubt be a prominent component of Zambia's socialist transformation.

SUMMARY

My purpose in this article has been to clarify government reform policies regarding Lusaka's informal sector with emphasis on the official role non-governmental institutions and artisanal occupations are expected to play in national economic development. Zambia is a country struggling to change economic and social direction. It is in transition, looking to achieve a "socialist transformation." Government reform policies toward markets and marketeers are more explicit than Todd and his colleagues believed. They focus on three broad socialist principles of development: social collectivism, state managed economy, and economic egalitarianism. Its purpose is to ensure equal access to essential foods and convenience goods through uniform costs and to reorganize occupational groups into cooperative societies to foster individual and group self-reliance. Designers of Zambia's socialist transformation have targeted markets and marketeers because they serve both the formal and the informal sectors and because workable urban reforms will apply to rural areas as well, thereby shaping a national food distribution policy.

Government and Party initiated reforms can work. The successes experienced thus far, however, seems to endorse a socio-political ideology but rejects its economic implications. With a few notable exceptions, marketing is confined to designated or authorized sites and collectivization of community and selected municipal markets has occurred. Its greatest success, however, continues to be in the low income, high density squatter settlements near the edge of the city. On the other hand, Council built and administered markets in and adjacent to the CBD and the expatriate, owner-operated shops in the high income, low density residential areas have avoided collectivization. Similarly, the government and the Party have experienced modest success in efforts to nationalize food distribution, especially at the lower end of the retail structure. Consequently, its power to enforce fixed prices and to forge an egalitarian society has been severely impaired. In the area of employment, collectivism, though vicariously, has generated hundreds of new jobs for prospective marketeers and other market based owner-operated enterprises. While markets can not continue to expand and increased numbers of marketeers will surely mean reduced profits, even at increased effort, markets remain the major source of gainful employment for new workers in the informal sector and the major system of food distribution for urban residents.

At the moment, government nor its official bodies have targeted markets and self-employed entrepreneurs for special assistance. Instead, government has sought to control them and its reforms have indeed been hostile and their effects have been a loss of "informality" and "independence." Markets and Marketeers, are proven contributors to the needs of urban residents and they should be afforded greater autonomy. To ensure a properly functioning food distribution system, Zambia must look to Africa's past. In the past, African central authorities exercised customary rights over markets in their territory, but did not exert direct, day-to-day authority over them. On site authority was delegated to a market official or an individual with acquired status and individual markets enjoyed considerable autonomy and self-management. While authorities did extract tolls, duties and other forms of state revenues, they were not excessive. Still substantial individual wealth and state revenues were generated (Figure 2). Conversely, markets were not instruments of social reform, but they were barometers of national prosperity and they did serve as indicators of sovereign rule. Entry was free and open to prospective marketeers and excessive profits were uncommon. Nevertheless, economic incentives were fundamental to market operations and they did ensure the availability of goods and services for prospective buyers. Lastly, state and local rulers provided "public" land for reinvestment and market expansion.

This reliance on the past is not retrogressive or romantic. Instead, it represents a reasonable approach to a systematic inclusion of markets into an over all strategy for urban food distribution, to the promotion of self-esteem through community based self-help projects and to the provision of greater opportunities for gainful employment. It rejects the constraints of nationalism and of egalitarianism, if achieved through government fixed prices, as strategies for development (Figure 2), but embraces the flexibility of collectivism as an effective way to ensure autonomy and the freedom entrepreneurs require to pursue reasonable profits. Speedy progress toward a socialist transformation, then, can be achieved by adapting market authority arrangements of the past to the social objectives of the present.

Theorists expected African leaders to adopt such a strategy. Dumont speculating on the future of socialism in the Third World, said that "the Third World socialisms have only just made their timid appearance. They will evolve, encounter many difficulties, and sometimes fail before they can be reborn from their ashes." Thus, for Dumont, the achievement of a socialist transformation in Africa, for example, would be gradual and the process could produce a form of socialism wholly unlike European socialism, "... but better adapted to their actual situation." The evidence presented here clearly shows that during its transition, Zambia has experienced many difficulties, some failures, and its reforms have had to be modified into standard operating procedures rather than official policies. Zambia's socialist transformation, slowed by opposition but untarnished by accommodation, will reflect the present-day realities of its informal sector.

TABLE 1

African Cities with Populations of 5 Million and Over by 2025

City Size in Millions	City and Country	City Size in Millions	City and Country
20-29.9	Cairo/Giza/Imbaba, Egypt Lagos, Nigeria	5-9.9	Abidjan, Ivory Coast Accra/Tema, Ghana Alexandria, Egypt
15-19.9	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria Ilorin, Nigeria Kinshasa, Zaire Nairobi, Kenya		Casablanca, Morocco Conakry, Guinea Contonou, Benin Dakar, Senegal Ilo, Nigeria Kaduna, Nigeria
10-14.9	Kampala, Uganda Harare, Zimbabwe		Katanga, Zaire Khartoum, Sudan Luanda, Angola Maputo, Mozambique Mambasa, Kenya Mushin, Nigeria Ogbomosho, Nigeria

SOURCE: "United Nations Population Division Data Bank (1982 Assessment)," Jean-Claude Chasteland, Director.

Map 1. Authorized and Unauthorized Markets in Lusaka's Commercial and Residential Areas, 1980



TABLE 1. -- SELECTED MARKETS IN LUSAKA: LEGAL STATUS, DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL, AND RESIDENTIAL LOCATION

Markets	Legal Status[a]	Approximate Date of Establishment[b/c]	Administative Control[b/c]	Location in the City
Luburma	Gazetted by S.I. 110	1960	Lusaka City Council	Second Class Shopping Area
Chilenji+	" " S.I. 63	1963	"	Municipal compound (authorized)
Matero	" " S.I. 64	1963	"	"
Cha Cha Cha	" " S.I. 81	1966	"	Central Business District
Kanyama+	" " S.I. 296	1966	"	Municipal compound (authorized)
Kabwata+	" N.A.	-	Leased to cooperative by Council	"
Chingmele	n.g.	-	"	-
Mandevu+	"	1974	Lusaka City Council	-
Chibolya	"	1962	"	Municipal compound (authorized)#
Chelston	"	1972	"	Low Density Suburb
Chunga	"	1965	"	Municipal compound (authorized)
Libala	"	1976	"	"
Kaunda Square	"	1976	"	"
Longacres	"	1976	"	Low Density Suburb°
Northmead	"	1970	"	"
Chaisa+	"	-	Exclusively cooperative	Shanty settlement (unauthorized)*
Mibelo+	"	-	"	"
Cigele+	"	-	"	"
Mutendere	"	-	"	"
Maripodi	"	-	"	"
Ng'ombe	"	-	"	"
Misisi	"	-	"	"
Banleni	"	-	"	"
Kalingalinga	"	-	"	"

Notes:
+ Markets under the jurisdiction of the Lusaka City Council but managed as a cooperative by UNIP Branch and Section officials. Rent Paid to Council.

* Unauthorized "shanty" compounds being upgraded and given legal status. No rent paid to Council.

\# Upgraded, high density compounds with legal status.

° Small grocery shops, European or Asian managed, and staffed with hired labor.

n.g. Ungazetted markets by 1980.

\- Data not available.

Sources:
a Government notice or Statutory Instrument (S.I.) 63 of 1963, City of Lusaka.
b Council Minutes; letters from the Town Clerk to the Legal Assistant TCD/6/45/1, 13-6-80.
c Lusaka City Council Market Records, 1976-80.

Figure 1
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL RETAIL SPACES IN LUSAKA



* Interstitial "free" space is technically restricted, but marketeers avoid taxes, fees, and license requirements because the area is difficult to police.

Figure 2
Changing Motives of Centrally Ruling Authorities[1]

The Nature and Effectiveness of Centrally Ruling Authorities

CUSTOMARY	LEGISLATIVE	LEGISLATIVE-AMENDED AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRIVILEGE
Decentralized Delegated Acknowledged	Appointed administrators	Appointed administrators Granted to members
EFFECTIVE RULE: Uneven, weak, often challenged	EFFECTIVE RULE: Uniform, power-base control with an urban focus- seldom challenged	EFFECTIVE RULE: Uniform, power/ideal-base control with an urban focus- often challenged
		- Comprehensive state/cooperative control of marketing - Regulation of movement and entry into trade Control of price and sale of selected commodities - Establishment of non-commercial zones - Establishment of protectionist laws to: restructure society and promote economic development
	- Prescribed (internal) structure of markets, location; price; weights and measures - Regulated movement of traders to: designate the location of commercial activities	
	*Market entry fees; uniform stall rate	*Rents, membership fees, society dues, fines
- Established markets - Levied tolls and fees on trade to: generate revenue and status		
BEFORE 1930 (Pre-colonial)	EARLY 1930 to 1960 (Colonial)	LATE 1960 to PRESENT (Post-colonial)

RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON PRIVATE TRADE AND MARKETS

Time

*Additional Sources of Revenue
[1] Based on Bauer's study of "State Control of Marketing in Developing Countries" (1974).